We review important developments in Empirical Industrial Organization (IO) over the last three decades. The paper is organized around six topics: collusion, demand, productivity, industry dynamics, inter…rm contracts, and auctions. We present models that are workhorses in empirical IO, and describe applications. For each topic, we discuss at least one empirical application using Canadian data.
Introduction
Thirty years ago, The Empirical Renaissance in Industrial Economics, (Bresnahan and Schmalensee, 1987 , eds.), was published. 1 That volume demonstrated how empirical research into industrial organization (IO) had moved away from the use of industry cross sectional data, as was prevalent in the earlier structure-conduct-performance literature, and towards the use of more disaggregate …rm level panel data. Moreover, many of the topics that are featured in that volume are also covered here. Although we also discuss research that was published more than 30 years ago, we emphasize the period since that time.
A lot has happened in 30 years. However, three developments have played a key role in the evolution of empirical work in IO during that period. The …rst is the availability of very large and detailed data sets, such as panel data on establishments and households; the second is the development of econometric techniques that enabled estimation of more sophisticated and richer models; and the last is the availability of vastly increased computing capacity and speed that allowed the …rst two to be combined. Although we do not focus on these developments, one should bear in mind that, without them, much of the research that we discuss would not have been possible.
Our mandate in writing this survey was to cover areas of empirical IO in which Canadians have made signi…cant contributions. On the one hand, that made our job very easy, since Canadians have made signi…cant contributions to all areas of empirical IO. On the other hand, it made our job very hard, since there were too many topics from which to choose. In the end, we chose to cover six applied areas: the demand for di¤erentiated products, tacit and overt collusion, productivity measurement, dynamic discrete choice, inter…rm contracting, and auction models. With each of those areas, we discuss general issues and questions, mention some seminal papers, give a ‡avor of the …ndings from many studies, and suggest areas where future research is needed. Furthermore, for each topic, we discuss at least one empirical application that uses Canadian data. Due to space constraints, we did not try to be comprehensive, either with respect to the choice of topics or to the choice of research to discuss within each topic, and we apologize to all those excellent researchers whose work we have neglected.
Demand for Di¤erentiated Products
Traditionally, empirical demand models were estimated with relatively aggregate data and focused on substitution and complementarity between broad product classes (e.g., food, housing, and clothing). Moreover, many such studies were based on ‡exible functional forms that place no restrictions on own and cross price elasticities. Those models were tractable because the number of products was small. However, with the advent of much more disaggregate data, applied economists have tended to focus on individual industries and the substitute products that they produce. Although the abundance of data has been a boon, it has also created problems; in particular, there are too many products. For example, there are hundreds of automobile models and brands of beer. The most common method of circumventing this problem has been to focus on a small set of characteristics (e.g., horsepower, fuel e¢ ciency, and size) in the spirit of Lancaster (1978) and to assume that products are bundles of characteristics, which are the things that consumers really care about.
In other words, the large dimensional space of products can be projected into the much smaller dimensional space of characteristics, thereby achieving tractability.
Most models of the demand for di¤erentiated products are cast in a discrete choice framework in which each consumer chooses the product or bundle of characteristics that maximizes its utility.
We therefore discuss those formulations before turning to some alternatives. We then ask two questions: where do consumer preferences come from and how are product locations chosen.
Discrete Choice Demand Models
The most popular discrete choice demand model is developed in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995, BLP) . That model builds on the familiar logit and overcomes some of its shortcomings, in particular the restricted nature of substitution patterns that the logit implies. With the logit, there is no notion of closeness in product characteristic space and cross price elasticities are determined by market shares (see, e.g., Berry, 1994) . We describe the BLP model below and then discuss some extensions.
We observe M markets in T time periods. However, we suppress t and m subscripts for expositional purposes. Suppose that there are I consumers indexed by i and J product characteristics indexed by j. Consumer i receives utility u ij from purchasing product j according to
where x j is a K dimensional row vector of observable product characteristics, p j is price, j is an unobservable product characteristic (often quality), and ij is a mean zero stochastic term. The coe¢ cients and are modeled as random coe¢ cients that can, in principle, have any multivariate distribution. However, it is standard to model them as independent normals,
where z i is a vector of observable characteristics of consumer i, such as demographics, is a matrix of coe¢ cients to be estimated, i is a vector of unobservable consumer attributes, and is a scaling matrix. Finally, there is an outside good, j = 0, whose utility is often normalized to zero.
One can aggregate the individual choices into a product level demand equation as follows
where s j is the market share of product j, the P 's are population distribution functions and A j is the set of individual speci…c variables that lead a consumer to choose alternative j: A j = f( i ; i ; z i ) :
u ij > u i`8`6 = jg. Since the integral in (3) is intractable, the model is often approximated using simulation methods. Furthermore, the unobserved product characteristic, (quality), is apt to be correlated with price, implying the need for instruments. Once the integral has been approximated, moment conditions can be speci…ed.
With the BLP model, unlike the logit, the interaction between product characteristics, x, and consumer characteristics, z and , introduces a notion of distance, which implies that products that are closer to one another in product characteristic space (e.g., two compact cars), are closer substitutes for one another.
The BLP demand model is usually imbedded in an industry supply/demand framework that incorporates imperfect competition, which is often assumed to be a di¤erentiated products Bertrand game. There have been many applications of this model, including Nevo (2000) , that looks at mergers in the breakfast cereal industry, and Petrin (2002) , that assesses the welfare implications of the introduction of a new product in the automobile industry, the minivan.
The BLP model requires enough moments to identify not only prices but also the distributional parameters, which can be hard to …nd with only market level data, particularly if there is only one market and time period. However, micro moments can sometimes be used to overcome this problem. For example, Petrin (2002) suggests using micro data that provide information on the joint distribution of consumer and product characteristics. In addition, Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (2004) augment market level data with data on individual …rst and second choices.
Other Formulations
Although it is the dominant paradigm, not all di¤erentiated product demand models involve singleunit discrete choices. In this subsection, we discuss two continuous choice formulations that involve restrictions on ‡exible functional forms and then turn to discrete continuous and multiple discrete choices.
Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (1994) specify a three stage demand system based on Gorman (1971) multi-stage budgeting approach. The stages are: i) aggregate demand for the product (beer); ii) demand for each segment (premium, light, and popular); and iii) demand for brands within segments. Estimation proceeds in reverse order. The speci…cation at the lowest level is the 'almost ideal demand system'of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) , which is ‡exible, whereas the upper two stages use log log formulations.
In contrast, Pinkse and Slade (2004) specify a demand system that is based on the normalized quadratic indirect utility function of Berndt, Fuss, and Waverman (1977) and McFadden (1978) , which is also ‡exible, combined with the distance metric approach developed in Pinkse, Slade, and Brett (2002) . The normalized quadratic yields a linear demand system with matrix of price coe¢ cients B = [b ij ]. Pinkse, Slade, and Brett assume that the coe¢ cients depend on measures of the distance between brands in product characteristic space, b ij = g(D ij ), where D ij is a vector of distances, such as the absolute value of the di¤erence in alcohol contents or whether two brands of beer belong to the same segment (lager, ale, or stout). Finally, the function g() is estimated semiparametrically. With this speci…cation, a notion of closeness among brands is introduced directly.
Both of these demand models are parsimonious while retaining substantial ‡exibility. Furthermore, in the applications, both are embedded in a model of industry equilibrium and used to evaluate beer industry mergers, the …rst in the US and the second in the UK.
There are also hybrid models in which consumers make discrete/continuous choices; they decide which brand to purchase followed by a choice of how many units to buy, where the latter can be a discrete or continuous number. Consumers can also purchase more than one brand. In other words, they can make multiple discrete choices, which is denoted multiple discreteness. Hendel (1999) develops a model that incorporates both aspects, multiunit and multibrand choices. In the application, he assumes that purchasers make decisions for multiple divisions of a …rm (purchases of computers) and that each division orders multiple units of a given brand, where the choice of brand depends on the tasks that the division performs.
Dube (2004) applies Hendel's speci…cation to model purchases of carbonated soft drinks. With grocery shopping, multiple discreteness occurs for two reasons: households can have more than one member and those members can consume soft drinks on more than one occasion. Dube (2005) applies the multiple discrete demand model to evaluate mergers in the US soft drink industry.
Modeling Consumer Preferences
With most BLP type models, consumer tastes are random draws from some multivariate distribution, and market shares are integrals over the unobservables, which include consumer characteristics.
Furthermore, the interaction of consumer and product characteristics implicitly de…nes a notion of closeness such that, when the price of a most preferred product rises su¢ ciently, an individual chooses a substitute that is 'close'to the original choice. In some cases, however, it is desirable to be explicit about consumers'locations in characteristic space and the associated distances between products and consumer tastes. The way in which this is done depends on whether those locations are observable or unobservable.
Geographic location is the most common consumer observable that is used to construct an explicit measure of distance. For example, Davis (2006) This means that there is less di¤erentiation and more intense price competition. He also …nds that markets are broader since, for example, price competition spills across suburbs, where consumers live, and the central city, where they work.
In many instances, however, consumer locations are not known. In particular, this is usually the case when products are located in a more general characteristic space. One solution to the problem is to modify the BLP model in (1) to include Hotelling (1929) 'transport'costs. Let consumer i's location (that is unknown to the researcher) be a K-dimension vector`i, and de…ne i's utility as
where is a vector of disutilities that are incurred when product j di¤ers from i's ideal product. This speci…cation di¤ers from other formulations that we have discussed in that the latent utility index is nonlinear in the random coe¢ cients. Moreover, since j is an unobserved product characteristic, it could enter the quadratic portion of utility.
However, results to date for nonparametric identi…cation of discrete choice models (e.g., Fox, Kim, Ryan, and Bajari, 2011, 2012; Berry and Haile, 2014) are for linear index models and/or models that are monotonic in j . 2 
Endogenous Product Characteristics
We have discussed di¤erentiated product demand models in the context of exogenous product characteristics. At an earlier stage, however, …rms choose where to locate their products in characteristic space. Some of the more recent literature on endogenous locations is surveyed in Crawford (2012) , who notes that there are two aspects to the problem of location choice: how many products to produce and what characteristics those products should possess. The …rst is more standard because the decision to o¤er a product is similar to the decision to enter a market, as in, e.g., Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) . However, most researchers add supply/demand pro…tability conditions to a typical entry model and estimate a two-stage game. For example, in the …rst stage, players decide which and/or what sort of products to o¤er and in the second, they engage in price competition.
When products are discrete, researchers tend to focus on product selection. For example, Draganska, Mazzeo, and Seim (2009) estimate a two stage game that endogenizes both the variety and the prices of ice cream products, and Sweeting (2013) assesses the choice of radio formats to o¤er in a dynamic context.
When the set of products cannot be easily changed, researchers tend to focus on the continuous choice of characteristics, sometimes just one -quality. If preferences are strictly vertical, each good competes only with its two nearest neighbors, as in Bresnahan (1987) . However, most researchers also include some aspects of horizontal di¤erentiation. Moreover, some researchers cast their problem in a monopoly framework, whereas others consider an oligopoly. Since the latter group is more relevant for our survey, we discuss some of that research.
Many of the oligopoly quality choice studies assess product repositioning after a change such as entry or a merger. In particular, price, quality, and/or horizontal characteristics can be altered in response to such a change. To illustrate, Chu (2010) looks at the e¤ect of satellite entry on cable television providers. The setting is a one-shot Stackelberg game with satellite as the …rst mover. Fan (2013) assesses repositioning of newspapers after a merger. Her model is a two-stage game with quality and other characteristics chosen …rst, followed by the choices of newspaper and advertising prices.
In a somewhat di¤erent vein, Pinkse, Slade, and Brett (2002) construct endogenous distances, rather than locations, in product characteristic space. To illustrate, outlet j is de…ned to be the exogenous closest geographic neighbor of outlet k if the Euclidean distance between j and k is less than that between k and any other outlet. In contrast, j is k's endogenous closest neighbor if k's delivered price at j's location is lower than at any other outlet's location. When locations or distances are endogenous, ingenuity is required to come up with valid instruments. In particular, a standard set of instruments for price, the characteristics of rival products or 'BLP'instruments, cannot be used. In our view, endogeneity of preferences and of product locations are areas where more research is needed before we can have a good understanding of the e¤ects of policy changes.
Collusion
Collusion has many de…nitions. We use the term, however, in the game theoretic sense -obtaining an outcome that is preferred by …rms to the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot competition game.
Collusion can be overt or tacit and it is often di¢ cult to distinguish between the two empirically.
However, unless overt collusion is legal (e.g., an export cartel), it requires enforcement mechanisms that are similar to those that can be used by tacitly colluding …rms. For this reason, we make no clear distinction between the two.
Empirical studies of tacit collusion are somewhat older than much of the research that we discuss, dating at least back to Iwata (1974) . However, there has been a recent resurgence of interest in the topic. Moreover, although most of the early studies were of homogeneous products, many recent applications involve …rms that produce di¤erentiated products. After discussing both classes of studies, we turn to an issue that has received much attention in Canada; the implications of cycles in retail gasoline markets for collusion and the competitiveness of those markets.
Collusion with Homogenous Products
Early studies of tacit collusion were concerned with measuring the outcome of a game without specifying that game. In particular, researchers asked how far the industry outcome was from some benchmark, which might be perfect competition or Cournot. In that literature, outcomes are summarized by a conduct parameter or parameters, , that can be industry wide or …rm speci…c.
To illustrate, suppose that industry output is Q, inverse demand is P = p(Q), and the output and marginal cost of …rm i are q i and c i , respectively. In a Cournot game, …rm i's …rst-order condition can be rearranged to yield P = c i q i p 0 (Q). If instead one remains agnostic about the game, the …rst-order condition can be modi…ed to include a conduct parameter, i as follows, 3
Equation (4) nests perfect competition ( i = 0), Cournot ( i = 1) and perfect collusion in an N …rm symmetric oligopoly ( i = N). Furthermore, (4) can be rearranged to yield the price cost margin, (P c i )=P = i = i , where i is the elasticity of the …rm's demand. In other words, i is the elasticity adjusted margin.
To implement such a model, one can estimate the …rst-order conditions jointly with demand and cost equations. Furthermore, in the absence of data on costs, one can specify a game (a value of ) and solve the …rst-order conditions for implicit marginal costs -those that rationalize the choice of . Finally, one can identify cost and conduct jointly by including shifters of the demand elasticity, 3 Many researchers aggregate the individual-…rm …rst-order conditions and estimate an industry from the relationship P = c Q p 0 (Q): With this speci…cation, conduct ranges from = 0 (perfect competition) to = 1 (perfect collusion). e.g., variables that rotate demand (Bresnahan, 1982) . This can be accomplished, for example, by considering supply shocks (Bresnahan, 1987) or multiple pricing regimes (Porter, 1983) .
Many static conduct models have been estimated and applied to evaluate not only the collusiveness of markets (Brander and Zhang, 1990 ) but also such issues as the competitive e¤ects of entry (Spiller and Favaro, 1984) , nonprice competition (Roberts, 1984) , or capacity constraints (Brendstrup, Paarsch, and Solow, 2006) .
Modi…ed conduct models have also been used to assess the predictions of speci…c dynamic games. For example, Porter (1983) tests the Green and Porter (1984) model of tacit collusion in which demand is stochastic and only an imperfect signal of price is observed. As a consequence, when a low signal is received, players cannot distinguish between a bad demand shock and cheating by a rival. Punishment (Nash reversion) will therefor be observed periodically. Porter evaluates the timing and duration of price wars among transporters of rail freight using a simultaneous switching regression model with periodic reversion from collusive to Bertrand behavior.
Not all price wars, however, can be explained by lack of observability of the choice variable. For example, despite the fact that prices are posted and thus easy to observe, price wars are common phenomena in retail gasoline markets. Slade (1989) models price wars in such markets as learning about new demand conditions after a large shock, and Slade (1992) evaluates that model using data from a price war in Vancouver. In particular, slopes of intertemporal reaction functions are latent variables, the system is estimated via the Kalman …lter, and di¤erent dynamic games correspond to di¤erent transition matrices for the latent variables.
Somewhat later, the use of conduct parameters to assess market power came under attack and, as a result, temporarily fell from favor. In particular, Corts (1999) argued that no inference on the extent of market power can be made without specifying underlying behavior. Although he notes that researchers have been careful to separately identify costs and conduct, the map between equilibrium variation and the equilibrium value of the elasticity adjusted price cost margin is fraught with problems. In particular, the mapping is not valid unless average and marginal responses of margins to demand shifters are the same.
In an assessment of the actual as opposed to the potential bias in conduct models, Genesove and Mullin (1998) use data on observed costs and margins in the sugar re…ning industry, an industry with a very simple …xed coe¢ cient technology, as benchmarks with which to compare an estimated model. They …nd that estimated and actual costs and margins are quite close, which is taken as support of atheoretical conduct models.
Collusion with Di¤erentiated Products
Perhaps because identi…cation of costs and conduct is more complex when products are di¤erentiated, the study of market power in such industries came later. Nevo (1998) studies identi…cation in multiproduct industries that produce di¤erentiated substitutes and notes that, in addition to instruments that rotate the demand equation, as in Bresnahan (1982) , there must now be demand shifters whose number grows with the number of products. Given that such a large number of exclusion restrictions is di¢ cult to satisfy in practice, he advocates a menu approach in which di¤erent values of conduct parameters that correspond to di¤erent games are speci…ed a priori and …t is compared using tests of non-nested models, as in Gasmi, La¤ont, and Vuong (1992) .
To implement his approach, Nevo (2001) uses data on ready-to-eat breakfast cereals, an industry that is characterized by high concentration, multiproduct production, and heavy advertising, to assess various models. To illustrate, suppose that N …rms produce J di¤erentiated products with N J. One can decompose the estimated price cost margins into three factors. The …rst, which is due to di¤erentiation alone, are the margins that are associated with the Nash equilibrium of the J single-product-…rm game. The second, which is due to multiproduct production, is the increase in margins that are associated with the Nash equilibrium of the N multiproduct-…rm game in which players internalize the externalities on own product sales that result from changes in own prices.
The third is the remainder, which is interpreted as due to tacit collusion. He speci…es a demand equation that combines elements of the Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) model with panel data methods and …nds support for the Bertrand equilibrium of the multiproduct-…rm game. In other words, there is no evidence of tacit collusion. Slade (2004) uses a similar decomposition to assess unilateral and coordinated e¤ects (joint dominance) in the UK brewing industry. Using the distance semiparametric demand model developed in Pinkse and Slade (2004) , she …nds no evidence of joint dominance. Note that the decomposition used in the papers by Nevo and Slade relies on exogenous cost data for comparison purposes. 4 Indeed, they do not use non-nested hypothesis tests to discriminate among models because they have something with which to compare the estimated models.
More recently, Berry and Haile (2014) demonstrate nonparametric identi…cation of a broad class of random utility models that includes those that discriminate among alternative models of conduct. Moreover, in contrast to the earlier focus on demand rotations, they show that there is a much broader range of cross-market and cross-…rm variation that can be exploited. Speci…cally, they show that identi…cation requires instruments that generate exogenous variation in choice sets including exogenous variation in markups. Such instruments can be exogenous changes in the number of …rms, in the characteristics of products, and in the costs of competitors.
A number of recent studies have estimated more general conduct models for di¤erentiatedproduct markets. We discuss three examples that study di¤erent markets and questions. All three of these studies eschew an attempt to estimate the mode of competition (e.g., Bertrand versus Cournot) and they overcome the Corts (1999) critique by specifying Bertrand competition and identifying conduct parameters conditional on that hypothesis.
The …rst, Ciliberto and Williams (2014), asks how multimarket contact, a notion that is formalized in Bernheim and Whinston (1990) , facilitates tacit collusion in airline markets. However, they do not model conduct as a matrix of free parameters, which would limply a need for instruments whose number grows with the number of products. Instead, they model conduct as a function of multimarket contact between …rm pairs, where contact is de…ned as the total number of markets that two …rms serve concomitantly. Building on Berry and Haile (2014), they use cross sectional variation in that variable to identify the conduct parameters. Their estimated model provides strong support for the hypothesis that contact facilitates collusion.
In the second study, Miller and Weinberg (2016) investigate how mergers in the US brewing industry facilitate tacit collusion. They postulate that competition was Bertrand prior to the merger and include an industry wide conduct parameter, , to capture increases in collusion post merger. Furthermore, in addition to more conventional instruments, they use the merger itself as a shifter. In their application to the Miller Coors joint venture, they …nd that the joint venture led to signi…cant increases in collusion. Moreover, they decompose their estimated price increases into portions attributable to unilateral e¤ects, coordinated e¤ects, and merger-speci…c e¢ ciencies.
The third study, Michel (2016) , also looks at mergers and uses the merger itself as a shifter.
However, Michel performs the converse exercise, assuming that the conduct parameter does not change post merger and estimating pre-merger conduct. Rather than specifying a conduct parameter as in equation (4), however, collusion between brand pairs owned by di¤erent …rms is treated as a parameter, , that captures the degree to which …rm i takes into account …rm j's pro…t in choosing its prices. 5 In other words, the conduct parameter is modeled as part of the …rm's objective function rather than as a behavioral response. Finally, in addition to estimating conduct, the speed and intensity of organizational integration are assessed by examining the extent to which merging …rms jointly maximize internal pro…ts after a merger.
Can Collusion Explain Unusual Price Patterns?
Some industries experience unusual price patterns such as cycles and economists often ask if those patterns are evidence of collusion. We illustrate with a discussion of studies that examine price cycles in retail gasoline markets.
Applications from Canadian Cities
The asymmetry of gasoline price responses to crude oil price changes, with rapid increases and slow declines, has been noted by many researchers (e.g., Bacon, 1991, Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert, 1997). However, most of that literature imposed little structure implied by theory. Eckert (1999) , in contrast, notes that some Canadian cities experience price cycles whereas others do not, and proposes that the two patterns -constant price and cyclical equilibria -can be explained by Edgeworth cycles as developed in Maskin and Tirole (1988b) . Moreover, he introduces the notion of large and small …rms and explores the relationship between the presence of independent stations and the existence of cycles. In particular, he demonstrates that, if the fraction of small …rms is su¢ ciently large, only cyclical equilibria exist. Eckert (2003) tests this explanation using data from Canadian cities and …nds support for his hypothesis. Noel (2007) explores the same issue and speci…es a Markov switching regression to estimate the prevalence of the di¤erent pricing regimes across Canadian cities. He …nds that cycles are more prevalent, and are accelerated and ampli…ed, when there are more small …rms in the market. Taken together, these studies support the hypothesis that cycles are evidence of noncooperative behavior.
Not all studies, however, conclude that cycles are not evidence of overt collusion. In particular, Clark and Houde (2014) show that cyclical pricing in some cities in Québec was collusive, with margins that were higher than those in other cities, that the high-margin markets exhibited asymmetric price adjustments to cost changes, and that the asymmetric pattern, as well as the high margins, collapsed after the Canadian Competition Bureau launched an investigation into collusion in those cities. Moreover, Clark and Houde point to explicit communication as a facilitator of equilibrium selection in those markets and use documents to support their claim.
Turning to the US, Deltas (2008) …nds a positive relationship between margins and asymmetric response, whereas Lewis (2009) concludes that the high retail margins that were experienced after Hurricane Rita dissipated more quickly in cities with cyclical pricing. The association between cyclical pricing and collusion is therefore an unsettled issue.
Finally, Wang (2009) explores a previously untested feature of the Maskin and Tirole (1988b) model -that …rms play mixed strategies at the bottom of the cycle to determine who will lead the price upwards. Using data from Australia, he con…rms that price leadership is better predicted by mixed strategies. It therefore appears that, at least in some markets, Edgeworth cycles explain the data well.
Production Functions and Productivity
Productivity, which is broadly de…ned as a measure of output divided by a measure of inputs, is important for economic growth and for industry and …rm competitiveness. In this section, we discuss various ways to measure productivity and its rate of growth as well as applications that use those measures. The productivity literature is vast and we limit attention to methods that are based on a production function.
Index Numbers
Perhaps the simplest way to estimate total factor productivity is to calculate an index number, since this does not involve econometric estimation. To illustrate, suppose that we have a production function y = f (x) + !, where y is output, ! is the state of technology, x is a vector of inputs, and all variables are in natural logarithms.
Under the assumptions of constant returns to scale (CRTS) and competitive pricing in the output market, 6 Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) show that total factor productivity growth, TFP=TFP is y t
Indeed, the rate of growth of TFP, which is the rate of technical change, is a back-of-the-envelope calculation.
Although this is a straight-forward and simple formulation, it relies on a number of restrictive assumptions, not only CRTS and competitive pricing but also all factors must be in long run equilibrium. For this reason, most index number productivity studies rely on a cost function, which overcomes the …rst two limitations, a variable cost function, which also overcomes the third, or some other formulation.
Much of the pioneering work in index number measures of productivity was done by Canadian economists, most notably Erwin Diewert. However, IO economists have tended to rely on econometric estimation of production functions. Nevertheless, index number formulations have proved to be useful tools in IO. A typical study regresses a TFP index on factors that are hypothesized to in ‡uence productivity. For example, Lychagin, Pinkse, Slade, and Van Reenen (2015) regress TFP indices on own and rival R&D expenditures, and they decompose R&D spillovers into those that are due to geographic proximity, to R&D overlap, and to product market similarity.
An advantage of the index number formulation is that it overcomes the input endogeneity problem that is discussed in subsection 4.3 below by moving the inputs to the left hand side of the equation. In other words, they become part of the dependent variable.
An application to Canadian Productivity Growth. A problem that surfaces in much of the productivity literature -capacity utilization -is often not acknowledged. To illustrate, if capital is …xed, the production function approach assumes that the only way to change output during a downturn is to reduce labor usage. In other words the full plant is utilized but fewer workers operate it. In reality, however, some production lines can be shut down, which means that measured and utilized capital can di¤er. It also leads to a puzzling phenomenon; namely that measured TFP growth rates are pro-cyclical and technical e¢ ciency declines during downturns. Gu and Wang (2013) propose a solution to this problem. They develop a method of adjusting TFP growth measures for changes in capacity utilization. In particular, they adjust percentage changes in capital in the Jorgenson-Griliches formulation to re ‡ect percentage changes in capacity utilization. Moreover, they show that the utilization rate is equal to the ex post return to capital divided by the ex ante user cost of capital. They apply their adjustment to Canadian manufacturing data and …nd that it eliminates some, but not all, of the pro-cyclical bias.
Functional Form
Most of the empirical literature in IO has focused on the estimation of Cobb-Douglas production functions using …rm-or plant-level panel data on output (Y ), a variable factor (labor L), and a quasi …xed factor (capital K). 7 This production function is,
where y it ,`i t , and k it are the logarithms of output, labor, and capital, respectively, of …rm i in period t; ! it represents …rm i's technical e¢ ciency; and e it is an additional error that is i:i:d: and uncorrelated with inputs (e.g., classical measurement error in output or transitory shocks that are 
with L , K (1 ), and LK = (1 )=2. This speci…cation has the advantage of being more general than the Cobb-Douglas but keeping the convenience of a linear-in-parameters regression model. Grieco, Li, and Zhang (2016) estimate a CES production function to study the problem of unobserved input price dispersion.
The translog production function (Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau 1971),
looks similar to the CES. However, the translog is more ‡exible, since it places no restrictions on input substitution patterns. In addition, unlike the other two functions, it relaxes the assumption that RTS are invariant over time and across …rms. On the other hand, the CES formulation is more parsimonious, since the number of parameters does not increase with the number of inputs. 7 More generally, L and K can be vectors of …xed and variable inputs.
Grieco, Pinkse, and Slade (2016) use a translog to assess changes in economies of scale and other forms of e¢ ciency that can be attributed to a merger.
Dealing With Endogenous Inputs
If unobserved productivity ! it is known to the …rm when it chooses its inputs, inputs and unobserved productivity should be correlated and the OLS estimator of the production function parameters will be inconsistent (Marschak and Andrews, 1944) . This is a fundamental problem in the estimation of production functions. 8 Two traditional approaches to dealing with this issue are the use of instrumental variables 
Dynamic Panel Data Models
Dynamic panel data methods have been used for the estimation of production functions under weaker restrictions than those in the …xed-e¤ect estimator. Blundell and Bond (2000) consider a speci…cation of unobserved productivity, ! it , with three additive components, a …rm …xed-e¤ect,
t , and a …rm-speci…c transitory shock that follows an AR(1) process, !
it . The three components can be correlated with contemporaneous inputs. Given this error structure, we have the following transformations of the Cobb-Douglas production function. 9 The equation in levels (or quasi …rst di¤erences),
where ! and it are the parameter and innovation shock in the autoregressive process for !
it . And the equation in …rst di¤ erences,
With the equation in …rst di¤erences, output and inputs in period t 2 and before are valid instruments since E( it j y it 2 ;`i t 2 ; k it 2 ) = 0. These moment conditions can be used to construct a GMM estimator of the parameters ( ! , L , K ), which is the Arellano-Bond (1991) GMM estimator. However, it is known that this estimator su¤ers from a weak instruments problem when some of the endogenous explanatory variables fy it 1 ;`i t ; k it g follow stochastic processes with substantial persistence (i.e., close to random walks). Unfortunately, this problem typically appears in the estimation of production functions.
To deal with this issue, Bond (1998, 2000) propose a system-GMM estimator that combines the Arellano-Bond moment conditions with additional moment conditions for the equation in levels (8) . Under the stationarity condition j ! j < 1, the error term (1 ! )! i + it is not correlated with the …rst di¤erence of output and inputs at periods t 1 and before:
Importantly, these moment conditions have identi…cation power even when the endogenous explanatory variables follow random walks. Blundell and Bond (2000) apply their System-GMM estimator to a sample of US manufacturing companies and …nd that the additional instruments yield more reasonable parameter estimates and pass speci…cation tests.
This method, together with the control function approach that we describe below, is the most common approach to estimate production functions these days. To illustrate, Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen (2015) use dynamic panel data methods to disentangle two countervailing R&D spillover e¤ects: a positive technology e¤ect and a negative business stealing e¤ect. They show that, due to these o¤setting tendencies, the social returns to R&D are signi…cantly higher than the private returns.
Olley-Pakes Models
Olley and Pakes (OP, 1996) propose a control function method to deal with the endogeneity of inputs. 10 Their approach is based on a simultaneous equations model that consists of the production function in (5) and the …rm's optimal decision rule for capital investment, i it = f t (k it ; ! it ), where i it represents investment at period t. There are three important assumptions on this investment function. First, input prices and other unobservable state variables a¤ecting pro…ts should not have cross-sectional variation. Therefore, the e¤ect of these variables can be represented by the time subindex in the investment function, f t (). 11 Second, the investment function should be strictly monotonic in the productivity shock ! it . Third, the function is not stochastic. In particular, investment depends deterministically on the state variables. Under these conditions, an inverse function ! it = f 1 t (k it ; i it ) exists and we can write:
1 0 They also deal with the selection issue that arises when …rms (nonrandomly) exit the data. 1 1 If input prices are observable to the researcher and they have cross-sectional variation, they can be included in the investment equation such that it becomes iit = ft (kit; rit; !it), where rit represents observable input prices. Then, the control function approach can be extended by including input prices in the set of control variables.
where t (k it ; i it )
. Without a parametric assumption on the investment function f t , equation (10) is a semiparametric partially linear model, and the parameter L and the functions t (:) can be estimated using semiparametric methods (Robinson, 1988) .
In a second step, the parameter for capital, K , is estimated using moment restrictions based on two additional assumptions: unobserved productivity ! it follows a …rst order Markov process;
and it takes one period for investment to become productive, i.e., time-to-built. For instance, if ! it follows an AR(1) process with parameter ! , we have the equation
where it t (k it ; i it ) has been estimated in the …rst step, and it is the innovation of the AR(1) process. Under the Markov and time-to-build assumptions, the unobservable it is orthogonal to it 1 , k it 1 , and k it . The parameters ! and K can be estimated in equation (11) Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015) identify an important identi…cation issue in the control function approaches of OP and LP. In those models there is implicitly a labor demand equation which, like the demand for materials, should depend on the state variables,`i t = h t (! it ; k it ). With the LP approach, this means that we can substitute the inverted materials demand equation into the labor demand equation to show that there is a deterministic relationship between employment, materials and capital in any cross-section t. This perfect collinearity means that it is not possible to identify the labor parameter L in the …rst step of the LP method. A similar argument applies to the OP method. Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (ACF) consider additional assumptions that can rescue the control function approach for production function estimation. In particular, they assume that labor is chosen before materials but after capital, which breaks the collinearity.
Note that the identi…cation in ACF method fully relies on restrictions on the serial correlation of the productivity shock and on the existence quasi-…xed inputs. These are very similar to the restrictions in the dynamic panel data methods described above. The main di¤erence between these methods is in the speci…cation of the stochastic structure of the productivity shock.
These identi…cation issues have renewed the interest in combining the production function with the restrictions provided by marginal conditions for ‡exible inputs (Doraszelski and Jaumandreu, 2013 ; and Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers, 2016).
Applications: Sources of Productivity Growth
The estimation of production functions, and the corresponding measurement of productivity, has been applied in IO to study the contributions of di¤erent channels to the growth of productivity in an industry. Examples include exogenous technical change, reallocation of inputs among …rms (including market entry and exit), adoption of new technologies, trade liberalization, improvements in product quality, and endogenous productivity growth related to investments in R&D or exporting to foreign markets. Olley and Pakes (1996) study the evolution of productivity in the US telecommunications industry after deregulation. They …nd that most of the increase in aggregate industry productivity was due to the reallocation of capital towards the more productive establishments, and a very small part comes from technical change.
Collard-Wexler and De Loecker (2014) investigate the sources of productivity growth in the US steel industry during 1963-2002. They …nd that the steel industry experienced a sharp increase in productivity during that period, and that this growth was mostly explained by the adoption of a new technology for producing steel -the minimill. The reallocation of inputs from plants using the old technology towards minimills accounts for a third of the increase in the industry's productivity.
Interestingly, the authors …nd that the new technology had a second, indirect but quantitatively important, impact on productivity. The expansion of minimills increased competition in the industry, and this generated a substantial reallocation of inputs also within the …rms maintaining the old technology.
De Loecker (2011) investigates the impact of trade liberalization on …rm productivity. As most previous studies dealing with this question, the measure of output is de ‡ated revenue and not output in physical units. De Locker proposes a novel approach to separately identify the contributions of (pure) productivity growth and prices. The empirical model combines a physical production function with a demand system for di¤erentiated products to generate a structural revenue production function. De Loecker estimates his model using plant-product level data from Belgium and studies the impact of trade liberalization in the textile industry. He uses the reduction in quotas as an exogenous demand shifter for the identi…cation of the structural parameters of the model. His empirical results show that distinguishing between revenue and physical output leads to a dramatic reduction in the estimate of the productivity increase from liberalization. In particular, his estimates imply that abolishing all quotas would lead to only a 2% change in productivity, in contrast to 8% when using measures of "productivity" based on de ‡ated revenue.
Finally, Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013) propose a model where the production function is Cobb-Douglas with capital, labor, and materials as inputs, but where total factor productivity follows an endogenous stochastic process that depends on the …rm's investment in R&D. More speci…cally, the process for productivity is ! i;t+1 = g (! it ; r it ) + i;t+1 , where r it represents expenditures on R&D, and g is an unknown function to the researcher. They propose an estimator of the structural parameters of their model that combines …rst order conditions for ‡exible inputs (labor and materials) and the restrictions on the stochastic process for productivity (i.e., the innovation i;t+1 is orthogonal to variables from period t and earlier). They estimate the model using a panel of Spanish manufacturing …rms during 1990-1999. Their empirical results show that R&D is a key determinant of the di¤erences in productivity growth across …rms.
Dynamic Structural Models
Competition in oligopoly markets involves important dynamic decisions. Firms' investments in capacity, inventories, product design, and market entry, have important implications for future pro…ts. On the consumer demand side, storable and durable products, consumer switching costs, habit formation, and learning also introduce dynamic aspects in competition. During the last decades, the increasing availability of …rm and consumer level longitudinal data and the advances in econometric methods and modeling techniques have facilitated the estimation of dynamic structural models of demand and supply in oligopoly industries.
Firm Investment at the Extensive Margin
Starting with the seminal work by Pakes (1986) and Rust (1987) , models and methods for dynamic discrete choice structural models have been applied to study …rm investment decisions at the extensive margin, e.g., market entry and exit, machine replacement, or adoption of a new technology. 13 Let a it 2 A = f0; 1; :::; Jg be the discrete variable that represents the investment decision of …rm i at period t. The pro…t function is:
p it represents output price. The term y it = f (a it ; k it ; z it ; y ) is a production function that depends on investment, a it , predetermined installed capital, k it , exogenous variables, z it , and the structural Every period t, the manager observes the state variables k it , p it , z it , and " it and decides its investment to maximize expected and discounted pro…ts E t P 1 j=0 j i;t+j , where 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor. The solution of the dynamic programming problem implies an optimal decision rule for investment as a function of state variables and structural parameters. This decision rule and the distribution of the unobservables imply a probability for the observed path of output and investment of a …rm. Rust (1987) that the probability that a store has a sale increases with the duration since the last sale both in that store and in other stores. Using supermarket scanner data for ketchup products, Pesendorfer shows that sales promotions have duration dependences that are consistent with the model. Kano (2013) studies how dynamic price competition in oligopoly markets can be an important source of price inertia even when menu costs are small. Strategic complementarity in price competition, together with menu costs, implies that …rms may decide not to respond to …rm-idiosyncratic shocks because they know that their competitors will maintain their prices constant. Kano estimates a dynamic pricing model that incorporates these strategic interactions and …nds that they account for a substantial part of price rigidity. A model of monopolistic competition that ignores strategic interactions among …rms can spuriously overestimate menu costs.
Dynamic Pricing

Dynamic Demand for Di¤erentiated Products
Many products are storable and consumers can buy them for future consumption. Static demand models ignore these dynamics and they can generate substantial biases and misinterpretations of consumer demand. Erdem, Imai and Keane (2003) and Hendel and Nevo (2006) propose dynamic discrete choice models of the demand for storable di¤erentiated products and estimate these models using consumer level scanner data.
Every period t, the consumer decides whether purchase one of J brands of a product, and the number of units (or size) q. Let d it 2 f0; 1; :::; Jg and q it 2 f1; 2; :::; Qg represent the brand choice and quantity choice of consumer i at time t, respectively. The consumer also decides how much to consume of each brand, that is represented by the J dimensional vector c it . Given choice fd it = j, q it = q, c it = cg, the per period utility of consumer i is:
u it (c) is the utility from consumption; C it (k it ) is the cost of holding inventories, where k it is the J dimensional vector of inventories by brand; and the term x jqt i i p jqt + jqt + " ijqt represents the utility from purchasing q units of brand j. The consumer makes purchasing and consumption decisions to maximize her expected and discounted intertemporal utility.
To make this dynamic demand model estimable, researchers must deal with the curse of dimensionality due to the very large number of state variables. For instance, Hendel and Nevo (2006) assume that there is product di¤erentiation at the moment of purchase but not for consumption and inventory holding. This implies that vectors c it and k it becomes scalars, the brand choice is a static decision, and all the dynamics is in the quantity choice q.
The empirical results in Hendel and Nevo (2006) transaction costs of replacement. The model implies that transactions costs can be identi…ed from the di¤erence between the share of consumers choosing to hold a given car type (not replace) and the share of consumers purchasing the same car type that period. Schiraldi estimates his model using data from the Italian automobile market, and evaluates the impact of scrappage subsidies.
Dynamic Games of Oligopoly Competition
Firms compete not only in prices or quantities but also in other dimensions such as market entry, capacity, quality, advertising, R&D and innovation, or product design. Since the seminal work by Reiss (1990, 1991) and Berry (1992) , empirical IO has experienced a substantial growth in the estimation of discrete choice games of oligopoly competition. This class of models has been applied to study market entry but also other forms of competition at the extensive margin such as product design (Mazzeo, 2002, Draganska, Mazzeo, and Seim, 2009 ), store location (Seim, 2006) , release date of a movie (Einav, 2010) , form of pricing (Ellickson and Misra, 2008) , or provision of customer services (Rennho¤ and Owens, 2012), among others.
During the last decade, empirical discrete choice games have been extended to incorporate dynamics. Ericson and Pakes (1995) provide a ‡exible framework for dynamic games of oligopoly competition that has become in ‡uential in IO. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) propose an estimable dynamic game based on Ericson-Pakes framework. Time is discrete and the game is played by N …rms. The decision variable of …rm i at period t is a it 2 A = f0; 1; :::; Jg. This action is taken to maximize the expected and discounted ‡ow of pro…ts in the market. The pro…t function is:
where a it is the vector with the actions of the other …rms, x it is a vector of state variables which are common knowledge to all the …rms, and " it f" it (a) : a 2 Ag is a vector of shocks that are private information of …rm i and i:i:d: across …rms and over time with CDF G. The vector of state variables
x it includes exogenous state variables (e.g., exogenous market characteristics a¤ecting demand and costs), and endogenous state variables. The nature of the endogenous variables depends on the speci…c application. For instance, in a game of market entry the …rm's incumbency status at previous period, a i;t 1 , is a state variable because it determines whether the …rm has to pay an entry cost to be active in the market. 
Inter…rm Contracting
Some transactions take place within …rms (vertical integration) and some occur at arm's length (spot markets). However, many others are governed by long term contracts, which are intermediate forms of organization that attempt to remedy the problems that are associated with the two extremes. In this section, we review the empirical evidence on contracting between …rms. In particular, we look at empirical work based on agency considerations (Holmstrom, 1979 (Holmstrom, , 1982 , transaction cost motives (Williamson, 1975 (Williamson, , 1979 , and property rights models (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990 ). Compared to the other sections in this article, there are two reasons why the research that is discussed here is somewhat di¤erent: …rst, it tends to be reduced form; and second, it is usually designed to test the predictions of speci…c theoretical models.
We consider a principal -a manufacturer or franchisor -and an agent -a supplier or retailer -who sign a contract. With an agency model, both principal and agent must exert e¤ort; for example, the principal's e¤ort can in ‡uence the quality of the brand or trademark whereas the agent's e¤ort can promote it. If e¤orts are unobservable, we have a double sided moral hazard problem. With double sided moral hazard, contracts can be used to allocate e¤ort incentives between principal and agent. In addition, the parties can have di¤erent risk attitudes and contracts can also allocate risk bearing.
With agency models, contracts are complete. However, both transaction cost (TC) and property rights (PR) theories emphasize incomplete contracts -ones that do not specify the actions that will be taken under all possible contingencies. Incomplete contracts cause problems when assets are speci…c, that is, when their value inside the relationship is greater than outside. TC and PR models di¤er, however, in important ways. The …rst emphasizes ex post renegotiation, haggling, and opportunistic behavior when both parties attempt to capture the rent that was created by speci…c investments. The second, in contrast, emphasizes ex ante investment and how the allocation of property or residual control rights in ‡uences investment decisions by changing the status quo in the ex post bargaining game.
Although contracts can take many forms, linear share contracts are common in many settings.
Those contracts take the form of q + f , where q is output or revenue, is the share of output that the agent receives, and f is a …xed fee (wage) that the agent pays (is paid). Table 1 classi…es share contracts. In particular, the two extremes, = 0 and = 1, correspond to vertical integration and spot market transaction. When is between zero and one, we have a share contract that involves risk sharing and provides intermediate incentives to both parties. If we assume that the principal is less risk averse than the agent, the table illustrates the moral hazard tradeo¤ between providing agents with insurance against risk and giving them incentives to exert e¤ort. It also illustrates a second tradeo¤ between providing incentives to the principal and to the agent.
Although property rights theories usually consider the two extremes of principal or agent ownership, if one interprets the share parameter as the probability of agent ownership, those models can also be seen in terms of table 1. In particular, there is a tradeo¤ between providing investment incentives to the principal or to the agent, with = 0 corresponding to vertical integration (principal ownership) and = 1 to market transaction (agent ownership). and Wu, 2004), and licensing agreements (Anand and Khanna, 2000) . We begin by looking at applications that assess share contracts in franchising. The …ndings from that setting, however, are mirrored in many others.
Empirical Analysis of Agency Models
Agency models yield many predictions that can be taken to the data. In particular, compared to company ownership, we expect to see more franchising (higher ) when the market is riskier, the agent's e¤ort is more important relative to the principal's, and monitoring the agent is easier (since direct monitoring is a substitute for incentive provision). Moreover, some studies assess the propensity to franchise outlets, a 0/1 decision (Brickley and Dark, 1987) , others the fraction of outlets franchised (Norton, 1988) , the terms of the contract, and f (Lafontaine, 1992; Brickley, 2002) , and the behavior of those terms over time (Lafontaine and Shaw, 1999) . The conclusions from these and other tests from many industries are summarized in (Lafontaine and Slade, 2007) , who note that the prediction that the agent (principal) will be given stronger incentives when the agent's (principal's) e¤ort is a more important determinant of pro…tability is strongly supported.
Furthermore, the predictions concerning monitoring are also con…rmed by the data. 15 In sharp contrast, the …ndings concerning risk are not supportive of the risk/insurance tradeo¤. We return to this issue later.
An interesting variant of the agency model is developed in Bitler, Moskowitz, and Vissing-Jorgenson (2005) who assess the share of capital that an entrepreneur (the agent) must sell to outside investors (the principals) who are concerned with moral hazard. In their data, they observe agent e¤ort and wealth as well as capital and labor inputs, and they model the simultaneous choice of e¤ort and conventional inputs, conditional on wealth. They conclude that entrepreneurial equity shares decline with risk and increase with wealth, which is consistent with the risk/insurance
tradeo¤.
An Application from Vancouver
The studies discussed thus far are concerned with an agent who performs a single task. However, in reality most agents must perform multiple tasks, a situation that is modeled in Milgrom (1991, 1994) , who show that the characteristics of one task can a¤ect the optimal payment scheme for another. Slade (1996) tests these predictions using data on share contracts signed by gasoline service stations (the agents) and vertically integrated oil companies (the principals) in Vancouver. In this setting, each agent performs two tasks: selling gasoline -the primary taskand either repairing autos or working in a convenience store -the secondary tasks. Moreover, she argues that, compared to repairs, which are preformed in the backcourt, convenience store sales, which can involve a common cash register, are more complementary with gasoline sales, where complementarity is de…ned in terms of cross-price elasticities, covariation in uncertainty, and cross partials of the cost of e¤ort function. In this industry, principal and agent sign a contract that is based solely on gasoline sales. However, the power of the incentives in those contracts di¤ers across contracts types. Slade asks if the characteristics of the secondary task can explain the di¤erences in incentives for the primary and concludes that the theoretical prediction that agents should be given lower powered incentives when the activities that they perform are more complementary is supported.
Empirical Analysis of Transaction Cost Models
Transaction cost arguments, which are less theoretical and more intuitive than the other two, also yield a rich set of predictions that can be taken to data. Moreover, whereas empirical tests of agency models are most often concerned with manufacturer retailer relationships, transaction cost and property rights studies usually examine procurement. For example, in an early study, Masten (1984) looks at how the characteristics of an input that a …rm uses can explain the make (vertical integration) or buy (contract out) decision. The characteristics that he focuses on are speci…city, complexity, and the importance of co-location, and he argues that an increase in any of those characteristics favors internal organization of a transaction. Using data on input procurement by aerospace …rms, he …nds evidence that favors for all three. Furthermore, as summarized in Lafontaine and Slade (2007) many other researchers have tested those predictions and have also found empirical support.
Contract duration is another characteristic that has often been subject to scrutiny. Indeed, researchers argue that contracts will be longer when …rms have made more speci…c investments, since the need to protect those investments is greater. Joskow (1985 Joskow ( , 1987 was perhaps the …rst to test this prediction. He used data on the relationship between coal suppliers and electric utilities and found support for the notion that, when the generation plant is located at the mine mouth, and thus the investment is more speci…c, contracts are of longer duration. Since that time many other researchers have assessed the relationship between speci…city and duration and have found evidence of a positive relationship between the two, results that are summarized in Lafontaine and Slade (2012).
Empirical Analysis of Property Rights Models
Given that both transaction cost and property rights models focus on incomplete contracts and speci…c investments, many researchers do not make a clear distinction between the two. However, some recent studies provide more clear-cut tests of property rights theories. We focus our discussion here on a few studies of ownership and control rights. 16 Two studies of alliances between …rms, Lerner and Merges (1998) , who assess technology alliances, and Elfenbein and Lerner (2003) who study internet portal alliances, examine the allocation of ownership and control. Both studies focus on two predictions: i) ownership of critical elements should be assigned to the party whose e¤ort is more important to the success of the agreement and ii) the allocation of control rights should be sensitive to the relative bargaining power of the parties. The studies con…rm both theoretical predictions.
An interesting variant is provided by Acemoglu, Aghion, Gri¢ th, and Zilibotti (2010), who assess technology intensity rather than speci…city. Like the model of Grossman and Hart (1986) , their model predicts that technology intensities of suppliers and producers should a¤ect the likelihood of vertical integration in opposite directions. Furthermore, using data on UK manufacturing plants, they provide evidence that supports that hypothesis. Moreover, they …nd that the e¤ect is larger when the upstream …rm is an important supplier.
Although the theories are very di¤erent, much research on property rights has a distinct agency ‡avor. For example, Baker and Hubbard (2004) investigate how the relationships between trucking …rms and truck drivers are a¤ected by contractual incompleteness and how those relationships change with the introduction of a new technology. In particular, they note that there is a tradeo¤ between having residual control rights (higher powered incentives) assigned to the driver, which leads to better maintenance of the truck, or to the company, which leads to better utilization of the ‡eet as a whole and less rent dissipation. Moreover, they …nd that the new technology, onboard computers, mitigated contractual incompleteness (lowered monitoring costs) and led to a fall in driver ownership.
Finally, the classi…cation in table 1 indicates that, if one interprets important e¤ort as important decisions/investments, then the many studies of the relative importance of agent (principal) e¤ort that are discussed in section 6.1 can be seen as lending support to property rights theories as well.
In that sense, property rights predictions can be seen as closer to agency than to transaction cost predictions.
Unobserved Heterogeneity
Most studies in the contracting literature treat principal, agent, and market characteristics as exogenous. However, a combination of unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous matching of agents to contracts, which is common in contractual settings, will lead to selection bias. In particular, the problem occurs when some characteristics are not observed and are omitted or when imperfect proxies are used. Although selection issues surface in many contractual environments, we illustrate with an agency model.
Agency theories predict that, all else equal, there should be a negative relationship between the risk that agents bear and the power of their incentives. The problem is that all else is very rarely equal. In particular, most empirical studies either ignore risk aversion, which is di¢ cult to measure, or use an imperfect proxy such as wealth. Unfortunately, both practices can lead to biased coe¢ cients. Furthermore, it is possible that the coe¢ cients of risk in contract choice equations will have perverse signs. For example, many researchers …nd that higher risk is associated with higher, not lower powered incentives, which is often described as a puzzle. 17 However, this empirical regularity could be explained if agents with high (low) risk tolerance choose riskier (less risky) markets and riskier (less risky) contracts, which would lead to a positive correlation between risk bearing and incentives in the data.
A number of solutions have been proposed as a remedy for the unobserved heterogeneity problem. For example, one could use panel data in which agents sign more than one contract. The problem with that solution is that agents rarely change markets (and therefore the riskiness of their market). Furthermore, the terms of contracts that are o¤ered by individual franchisors show remarkably little temporal variation Lafontaine and Shaw (1999) .
In the context of sharecropping, Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) propose an instrumental variable solution in a reduced form setting. They suggest estimating a matching equation that includes instruments that a¤ect the matching process between principals and agents but do not in ‡uence the terms of the contract. In their agricultural setting, the choice is between sharecropping and …xed rent contracts, and they argue that one can exploit cross regional variation in contract terms to create geographic instruments. Unfortunately, in the inter…rm context, this is often not feasible. For example, at any point in time, McDonald's o¤ers the same franchise contract to all of its franchisees.
In the context of health insurance, Handel (2013) proposes a structural remedy and applies it to the choice of insurance plan. In his model, agents have CARA utilities and the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion is modeled as a random coe¢ cient that is a function of family demographics.
He uses forecasts of out of pocket expenses, the risky variable, to create a family and health plan speci…c ex ante distribution of risk and creates an expected utility function by integrating over those distributions. Finally, he assumes that each family chooses the plan that maximizes its utility. However, he studies the role of adverse selection and does not evaluate the risk insurance tradeo¤. Nevertheless, the techniques that he develops could be used in an inter…rm moral hazard setting.
Unfortunately, much more research is needed in the inter…rm contracting area before one can determine if endogenous matching can explain the empirical risk/incentive puzzle that surfaces in so many applied studies.
Structural Contracting Models
The research that we have discussed in this section so far is mostly reduced form. However, there is a growing structural contracting literature, and the two sorts of models di¤er in important ways. First, whereas agency models are often cast in a competitive downstream environment with principals making take it or leave it o¤ers, structural models usually consider strategic behavior in both up and downstream markets. Second, whereas the former emphasize the alignment of e¤ort incentives between principal and agent or investment incentives across …rms in a vertical chain, the ine¢ ciency that the latter emphasize is the double marginalization that results when both links in the chain have market power. Finally, in contrast to reduced form models that cannot be used for welfare analysis, welfare calculations are often the primary objective of structural modeling.
A generic structural contracting model has three layers: an upstream market, a downstream market, and an interface between the two (the contract), and one must specify the structure of all three. For example, one might assume that both up and downstream competition is Bertrand Nash, whereas the contract might be determined in a Nash bargaining game. As with any structural model, the conclusions that are reached depend critically on the accuracy of the assumptions that are made, which should be tailored to …t the markets and institutions that are studied.
Structural models can be divided into two classes that depend on whether the researcher has data on the contracts. We discuss studies that make use of contracting data before turning to the second class. Mortimer (2008) (2015), who assess competition between hospitals and managed care organizations, take a di¤erent approach to the interface. In particular, they use a bargaining model that is due to Horn and Wolinsky (1988), which nests a Nash bargaining solution within a Nash equilibrium and includes take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers as a special case. Both …nd that bargaining restrains downstream prices and increases consumer welfare.
Studies that do not have data on contracts are more closely related to the research on demand and collusion that is discussed in subsections 2 and 3 than to the incentive contracting literature.
In particular, it is often assumed that competition up and downstream is di¤erentiated products 
Auctions
Auctions are common mechanisms for selling goods and services such as agricultural products (e.g., …sh, livestock), natural resources (e.g., timber, oil and gas drilling rights), government contracts, money in interbank markets, treasury bonds, electricity, or art work. More recently, internet auctions (e.g., eBay) have become a popular way of selling a diverse range of products.
Auctions can be modelled as games of incomplete information. Each bidder decides her bid, b i , to maximize her expect payo¤. Most of the empirical literature has focused on …rst-price auctions: the winner is the highest bidder (provided it is higher than the seller's reservation price) and she pays her bid. Under this rule, the expected payo¤ is:
where 1f:g is the indicator function. This literature assumes that bids come from a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE). This BNE is described as a vector of N strategy functions fs i (v i ) : i = 1; 2; :::; N g such that each bidder's strategy maximizes her expected payo¤ taking as given the strategy functions of the other bidders:
where the expectation is taken over the joint distribution of fv j : j 6 = ig (and c, if this is not common knowledge). This BNE can be described as the solution to a system of di¤erential equations.
Most empirical applications of structural auction models have focused on the Independent Private Values (IPV) model. This model assumes that valuations depend only on private information signals, U (v i ; c) = v i , and they are independently and identically distributed, i.e.,
It also imposes the restriction that the data come from a symmetric BNE: s i (v i ) = s(v i ) for every bidder i. A BNE of the IPV model can be described as a strategy function s(:) that solves the di¤erential equation:
subject to the boundary condition boundary s(v) = v, and where f is the density function of the distribution F . This di¤erential equation has a unique solution that has a closed-form expression.
Auction data is widely available. In many countries, procurement auction data must be publicly available by law. Empirical researchers have used these data to answer di¤erent empirical questions such as detecting collusion among bidders, testing di¤erent auction models, or designing auction rules that maximize seller's revenue or total welfare. In the structural estimation of auction models, the researcher has some information on bids and uses this information and the equilibrium conditions to estimate the distribution of bidders'
valuations. Auction data may come in di¤erent forms, and this has important implications for the identi…cation and estimation of the model. In an ideal situation, the researcher has a random sample of T independent auctions (indexed by t) of the same type of object from the same population of bidders, and she observes the bids of each of the N t bidders at every auction t in the sample. Such ideal situations are rare in practice. For instance, often the researcher observes only the winning bid. Also, it is common to have a sample of similar but heterogeneous auctions (e.g., di¤erent environments, or non identical objects) such that it is not plausible to assume that the same distribution of bidders'valuations, F (:), applies to the T auctions. In that case, it is useful to have observable auction characteristics, X t , such that the researcher may assume that two auctions with the same observable characteristics have the same distributions of valuations:
for every auction t. In general, an auction dataset can be described as fb (n) t ; X t : n = 1; :::; N t ; t = 1; 2; :::; T g, where b
(1) t is the largest bid, b
(2) t is the second largest, and so on; and N t is the number of bids the researcher observes in auction t. When the dataset includes only information on winning bids, we have that N t = 1 for any auction t.
Tree planting procurement auctions in British Columbia. Paarsch (1992) studies …rst price sealedbid auctions of tree planting contracts operated by the Forest Service (government agency) in the province of British Columbia, Canada. The object of an auction is described by the number and type of trees to plant and the location. The bidding variable is the price per tree, and the winner of the auction is the …rm with the lowest price. The dataset consists of 144 auctions in the same forest region between 1985 and 1988 with information on all the bids. Paarsch estimates structurally independent private value models and common value models under di¤erent parametric speci…cations of the distribution of …rms'costs. All the speci…cations of private value models are rejected. However, the estimated common value models are consistent with observed bidders' behavior. More speci…cally, there is evidence consistent with bidders' concern for the winner's curse and with bid functions that increase with the number of bidders.
The …rst empirical applications on structural auction models consider parametric speci…cations of the distribution of valuations (Paarsch, 1992 (Paarsch, , 1997 La¤ont, Ossard, and Vuong, 1995; Baldwin, Marshall, and Richard, 1997) . However, the more recent literature has focused on the nonparametric identi…cation and estimation of this distribution. Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) show that equation (17) , that characterizes the equilibrium of the model, implies that a bidder's valuation is a known function of his bid and the distribution of observed bids. Let G(b) and g(b) be the distribution and the density function of bids, respectively, implied by the equilibrium of the model.
Since the equilibrium bidding strategy, s(v i ), is strictly increasing, we have that v i = s 1 (b i ) and G(b i ) = F (s 1 (b i )), and this implies that g(b i ) = f (v i )=s 0 (v i ). Substituting these expressions into the di¤erential equation (17), we get:
Based on this equation, the distribution of valuations can be estimated from the data using a twostep procedure. Suppose for the moment that the data consists of a random sample of independent and identical auctions with information on all bids. Then, the distribution and density functions, G and g, can be consistently estimated at any value b 2 [b; b] using nonparametric methods. In a second-step, we can use equation (18) In Krasnokutskaya's model, bidders' valuations have a multiplicative structure:
where v it is private information of bidder i at auction t, and c t is common knowledge to all the bidders in auction t. She provides su¢ cient conditions for the nonparametric identi…cation of the distribution of the two components, and proposes an estimation method. 19 Krasnokutskaya applies her method to data from Michigan highway procurement auctions. She …nds that, after conditioning on observable auction characteristics (e.g., number of bidders and project size), private information explains only 34% of the sample variation in winning bids. The remaining sample variation comes from unobserved heterogeneity from the point of view of the researcher. Estimates of the model that ignore this unobserved heterogeneity provide substantial biases in the average and the variance of …rms'costs, and underestimate …rms'mark-ups.
Asker (2010) considers a similar model where bidders'valuations have a multiplicative structure between IPVs and common knowledge auction heterogeneity. He applies this model to estimate the damages and e¢ ciency costs of a "bidding ring" (cartel) in the US market for collectible stamps. Like Krasnokutskaya, he …nds that accounting for unobserved auction heterogeneity has an important impact on the estimated model and its economic implications. The model without unobserved heterogeneity over-estimates the cartel's damages to the seller by more than 100%, and under-estimates the e¢ ciency loss from the cartel by almost 50%.
Haile and Tamer (2003) study the identi…cation of the distribution of bidders's valuations in
English auctions under more realistic conditions that the standard theoretical model. In the theoretical model, price increases continuously and each bidder pushes a button to exit the auction when the price reaches her valuation. In contrast, in actual English auctions, prices typically rise in jumps of varying sizes, bidders do not need not indicate whether they are "in" or "out" as the auction proceeds, and they can call out bids whenever they want. Haile 
Conclusions
Over the last three decades, researchers in empirical IO have generated useful models and methods to study demand, productivity, auctions, market power, contracts, and industry dynamics, as well as many other topics that we have not included in this survey. Important developments in structural microeconometrics have been originated in the context of dealing with empirical questions on market competition and …rms' behavior. Many of these models and techniques have been 'exported' to other …elds of empirical micro such as trade, urban, health, public, environmental, education, development, …nance, and labor.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the increasing availability of larger and more detailed data sets has played a key role in the evolution of empirical IO during this period. In the current era of big data, we can only expect that this trend will continue in the future. Richer data will not be a substitute for structural models. On the contrary, as in the past, better data will make possible the estimation of more realistic and ambitious models of consumer behavior and …rm competition. The increasing availability of randomized experiments on …rms'competition will make the identi…cation of these models more robust and reliable.
